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Metaphoric frames are prominently featured in public discourse. They highlight certain 
aspects of the target issues they are used to describe, thereby encouraging specific patterns of 
inference. Our goal was to test whether they would influence memory as well. Building off prior 
work, we contrasted two metaphors for crime: virus and beast. In a pilot study, we identified 
specific causes, examples, and solutions to crime that were congruent with each frame (one but 
not the other; e.g., people thought “drug use” better exemplified a crime virus, whereas “murder” 
better exemplified a crime beast). Participants (n = 469) read or listened to a short 
metaphorically-framed crime report, completed a filler task, and were prompted for the 
information they had seen/heard. Results indicated the virus metaphor facilitated memory, 
overall, but not the specific frame-congruent information, suggesting a more general influence of 
the frame than predicted.  
 





METAPHOR AND MEMORY 
 
3 
Metaphor and Memory:  
How Metaphors Instantiate Schemas in and Influence Memory of Narrative 
Introduction 
  Ken Kesey, author of One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest is famous for saying, “To hell 
with facts! We need stories” (Christelis, 2015). While some might vehemently deny the truth of 
this statement, it is often the norm in human communication. Stories are inextricably linked to 
the way people think. Ted Sarbin (1986) even posited the idea of narrative as the “root 
metaphor” of, or framework for, psychology.  Some researchers believe that stories are vital for 
linking a person to their society and argue that the way in which individuals engage in cultural 
narratives shapes their greater understanding of their identity within a society as well as their 
relation to those outside of it (Hammack & Pillecki, 2012). This form of cultural storytelling can 
most clearly be seen in news media. From Ronald Reagan’s declaration of a “War on Drugs” to 
the perpetuated narrative of the mentally-ill mass murderer, narratives and narrative framing are 
a fundamental aspect of how politics and news are conveyed to the public (Elwood, 1995; Carey, 
2016). Instead of shaping arguments based purely on fact, politicians and other public speakers 
use rhetorical devices and narrative form to try to persuade listeners of their own point of view. 
These portrayals are not without influence: in fact, the framing of political speeches and news 
coverage can have wide-ranging effects on public perceptions.  
One such rhetorical form is the metaphor. Metaphors can turn a complex or distressing 
concept into something much more straightforward and understandable for the public. So, by the 
magic of words, politicians, like former President Reagan, can turn the complexities of the 
federal budget into a much more comprehensible idea: a baby, with “an insatiable appetite at one 
end and no sense of responsibility at the other” (Read, Cesa, Jones, and Collins, 1990).  Yet by 
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making the federal budget more understandable, Reagan also puts forward a very specific 
interpretation of how it works. From media’s substantial use of metaphor rises an important 
question: does metaphoric framing influence memory as well as perception?  
One group of researchers came close to answering this question. In 1990, Read, Cesa, 
Jones, and Collins examined how participants remembered and responded to short narratives, 
framed with metaphors such as “Giving loans to Zaire was like offering crates of whiskey to an 
alcoholic”. They found that starting a short passage with a metaphor increased memory for the 
information contained within the passage, particularly if the participants were exposed to the 
narrative auditorily.  But these researchers only examined how much participants were 
remembering, not what information they remembered. There is no mention of whether the 
information recalled was highly relevant to or consistent with the metaphor given, which leaves 
the burning question – do metaphors influence memory in a systematic way? After all, 
metaphors create a connection between two unlike ideas, so as to produce new associations that 
the target (the idea being described by the metaphor) would not otherwise have. We argue that 
metaphors create these associations through the instantiation of schemas of the metaphor source 
– the concept used to describe the target. 
 Throughout the course of this paper, we will begin by exploring the history of research 
on narrative and narrative framing. We will then turn to the current research on the effects, 
persuasive or otherwise, of metaphoric framing specifically. From there, we will explore how 
metaphors relate to and instantiate schemas, creating a narrative out of disconnected concepts. 
This will bring us to the current studies we performed to determine whether metaphors, when 
embedded into narratives, can instantiate schemas, and therefore systematically influence 
memory.  




Storytelling has been a part of humanity since time immemorial. Although story schemas 
- the precise structures of and within narrative - can change from culture to culture or era to era, 
the continued presence of stories is a testament to humanity’s persistent love of narrative (van 
Dijk, 1977; Kintsch, Mandel & Kozminsky, 1977). But narrative is not just beloved and shared, 
it is changed through the process of transmission. In the seminal research by F.C. Bartlett (1932), 
narratives were read, recalled, and transmitted through generations of participants, so that each 
participant read the version of the narrative from the person before them and changed the 
narrative through their own recall – a process Bartlett called “serial reproduction”. Over the 
course of generations, the narratives underwent a series of changes: information became 
emphasized or deemphasized based on the cultural background and particular points of view of 
the participants. However, one limitation of Bartlett’s research is that it was not systematized – 
he did not control the changes and frames produced by the participants, so it is unclear which 
aspects of one narrative produced which alterations in the recall of another participant. 
Fortunately, since Bartlett, many researchers have tackled the idea of narrative transmission and 
framing.  
One such researcher is Shanto Iyengar, who created a number of studies examining the 
presentation of news stories. In particular, Iyengar examined three major forms of media 
influence: agenda-setting, priming, and framing (Iyengar & Simon, 1993). The first, agenda-
setting, is the way in which a topic’s presentation can influence its perceived importance. The 
perceived primary agendas of the nation or the world are set by the presentation of otherwise 
inaccessible information.  As a result, an issue featured prominently in edited news shows is 
considered to be much more important by viewers than other issues. In this way, news media can 
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shape which aspects of current events are considered relevant or, by highlighting their campaign, 
make a presidential candidate a serious contender (Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder, 1982). The 
second, priming, allows for viewers to more easily access information related to that presented in 
a news program. For example, if a person viewed coverage of the Gulf War about twenty years 
ago, the Gulf War would be a larger factor in their assessment of George Bush Sr.’s competence 
as a president (Iyengar & Simon, 1993).    
But of greatest interest to our research question is the Iyengar’s third interest – framing, 
or the presentation of a story. The way in which a news story is presented can heavily influence 
not only how people perceive an issue, but also how they wish to respond to it. Respondents to 
Iyengar’s survey who watched more of the highly militaristic press coverage of the Gulf War 
were much more likely to express support for a militaristic rather than a diplomatic response to 
the crisis. By viewing stories where the conflict was presented as militaristic, respondents were 
more likely to adopt that viewpoint and see a militaristic solution to a militaristic problem. The 
way in which media coverage is framed changed the way in which people viewed the crisis and 
its solution (Iyengar & Simon, 1993).    
However, framing can have persuasive effects not just when using a particular tone or 
perspective, but also when using metaphors. Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) examined how 
two metaphors about crime can influence participants’ perspectives and decisions related to 
crime. When reading a short narrative about crime, participants who were exposed to a metaphor 
which described crime as a virus infecting a city were more likely to support policy decisions 
such as eradicating poverty and improving education. Meanwhile, participants who read a 
metaphor describing crime as a beast preying on a city were more likely to support jailing 
criminals and enacting harsher enforcement laws. These changes in participants’ perspectives 
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and solutions to the city’s crime problem were even larger than those produced by either political 
affiliation or gender – indicating a large shift in perspective even through the use of a one-word 
metaphor.  Thibodeau and Boroditsky’s (2011, 2013) metaphors were most persuasive when 
included early in the narratives. It is likely, therefore, that the metaphors are shaping how 
participants understand the issue and encode its contents – producing a particular point of view 
for their readers. This finding was supported by Sopory and Dillard’s (2015) meta-analysis of 
metaphoric persuasion, which found that using a single metaphor early in a message is the most 
effective in terms of producing attitude change compared to non-literal statements.  
As a result, changes in metaphoric framing – and therefore in the perspectives of the 
populous -  can have wide-spread implications for public policy. In his infamous “War on 
Drugs” statement, Reagan framed drugs and their sources as enemies to be defeated. By 
instantiating this framework, Reagan set into motion a number of policies, which treat drug 
offenders as enemies of the state instead of non-violent criminals, a choice which has expanded 
the United States’ prison population to the largest in the world (Branson, 2012). But this 
metaphor influenced not only the harsh tactics used to deal with America’s complicated 
relationship with drug use and distribution, it also fostered many metaphorical children, 
including the War on Religion, the War on Terror, and the War on Cancer. These metaphors of 
war bring whole new connotations to the conflicts they describe, pushing for a clear, quick 
victory using aggressive action and strength (Elwood, 1995).  
However, a metaphor frame may not always fit the behavior it seeks to change. The 
metaphor of war removes all thought of compromise, peace, and negotiation, which have 
connotations of weakness in the face of danger. Such thinking reduces the options which seem 
viable to those who adopt it, even when those options are a poor choice in weapon (Elwood, 
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1995; Coleman, 2015). Cancer, for example, is not something that can be wholly destroyed; for 
as long as we have cells, we can expect there to be copying errors that may result in cancer 
(Coleman, 2015). However, “the War on Cancer” implies that if we use radical and experimental 
treatments for cancer, we will be victorious over it and eradicate it forever. But this metaphor, as 
Hauser and Schwarz (2014) found, not only perpetuates aggressive treatments but reduces 
reliance on preventative measures, such as eating healthy and avoiding carcinogenic substances. 
Self-limiting does not match with the idea of fighting an enemy (i.e., a war schema), so it is not a 
course of action which is considered, to the detriment of individuals’ health (Hauser & Schwarz, 
2014).  
But while we know that metaphors can be extremely persuasive and potentially 
dangerous, we have little idea how they affect memory. Research regarding memory and 
metaphor is far more uncommon than research concerning metaphor and persuasion. 
Unfortunately, what little research that exists is primarily associated with the memory of 
metaphors themselves rather than any surrounding or associated material. Richard Harris (1979) 
showed participants a series of novel metaphors, “dead metaphors”, and non-metaphoric 
statements, in order to see which of those three categories were remembered best, believing that 
the vivid novel metaphors would be more easily remembered than either clichéd “dead 
metaphors” or non-metaphoric statements. While Harris found that metaphors were remembered 
no better or worse than non-metaphoric statements, his research was fraught with methodological 
problems, including using the aforementioned arbitrary categorization of the statements as 
metaphors, "dead metaphors", and non-metaphorical statements. This arbitrary categorization 
would be excusable – for sometimes instinct is the only option available for categorization – if 
the metaphors he used were actual metaphors. However, the phrases used were not so much 
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metaphors as personification (e.g. "The ivy cuddled up to the window", as compared to the “dead 
metaphor” of “The ivy crept up to the window” and the nonmetaphoric “The ivy grew up to the 
window”). While there is some comparison between the ivy and a person curled up with a loved 
one, there are so many different possible implications given by the word “cuddled”, any 
associations are unspecific. Then, since these “metaphors” possessed no actual comparison 
between a source and target, it is uncertain whether they would work the same way cognitively 
as actual metaphors.  
Although Allyssa McCabe's (1988) article on memory of metaphor is more 
methodologically sound than Harris’ work, her research still did not involve the surrounding 
information. While she manipulated the context in which the metaphors were shown in order to 
better replicate actual exposure to metaphors, McCabe’s work once again looks at metaphors as 
the dependent measure, rather than the manipulation. She simply wished to determine under 
what contexts metaphors were best remembered. Therefore, we are left with two important 
questions: if metaphors can change perspectives and increase persuasion, can they also alter 
memories in similarly systematic ways? And if they can, how do they do so? 
Instantiating Schemas 
Our theory is that metaphors create associations with different schemas – specific 
knowledge structures – with the information they describe – commonly referred to as their 
targets. Through their connections to these schemas, metaphors can affect how people attend to 
the information they are processing and how they represent it in memory. Schemas – while 
known to influence memory, particularly in the case of eyewitness crimes, where schema-typical 
information is remembered much better over the long term (see: Graesser et al., 1980; Brewer & 
Treyens, 1981; Hastie & Kumar, 1979) – have been considered integral to how narratives are 
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remembered since reproductions of Barlett’s research. Kintsch and Greene (1978) found that one 
of the major reasons that Bartlett’s participants changed the narrative they read was because of 
the narrative’s use of unfamiliar story schemas. As a Native American folktale, Bartlett’s 
infamous “The War of the Ghosts” short story used terms and concepts, as well as the narrative 
structure itself, which were foreign to the European-American participants. Since the participants 
did not have the knowledge structures to represent them, information related to these unfamiliar 
schemas was lost.  
However, metaphors convey a series of benefits that do not come with schemas. Like 
schemas, metaphors have a strong influence on cognition, even shaping the way people think 
about abstract concepts (see: Conceptual Metaphor Theory [CMT] from Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980). For example, time is often described in terms of space – time flies by much like landscape 
does on a road trip and the future is ahead like a traveler’s next destination (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980) - and power and valiance are both explained with verticality – with up being stronger or 
more positive, while down is weaker or more negative (Meier & Robinson, 2004; Schubert, 
2005). In this way, metaphors hold sway over the way people comprehend the world (e.g., Jia 
and Smith, 2013; Williams & Bargh, 2008). As previously mentioned, metaphors are known to 
increase persuasion  (Sopory & Dillard, 2002) and can influence what solutions people either 
select or come up with for problems that have been framed with particular metaphors (Thibodeau 
& Boroditsky 2011, 2013).  But above all else, it is our belief that metaphor framing allows the 
speaker to control not only which schemas but also which aspects of those schemas are accessed 
by participants.  
By using a metaphor, the same concept can affect the listener in an entirely different way 
by accessing specific aspects of the schema. For example, in the metaphor she was lost in a sea 
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of grief, grief is associated with a turbulent sea and contains similar properties: loud, harsh, 
confusing, violent, and removing any sense of control from the individual. However, a different 
variation on a source can produce vastly different connotations for the same target. Instead of 
describing grief as a turbulent ocean, another metaphor – she drifted on the flat sea of grief – 
compares grief to a still ocean: expansive, empty, never-ending, isolating, and draining. While 
both metaphors use the same schema of the sea, they each take very different aspects of it to 
describe the emotional state of a grieving woman. If she stood in the grocery store, staring at the 
cereal options, and unable to make a decision, is it because of the maelstrom of emotion 
impeding her decision or is the emptiness so overwhelming that such a decision seem impossibly 
exhausting? Would she respond positively or negatively to outside stimulus? A person’s choice 
could easily be swayed one way or the other depending on which of the sources – the maelstrom 
or the empty expanse -  is used.  
The Present Studies  
Our goal, then, is to determine whether metaphor can systematically influence not just 
people’s perspectives on a given issue, but also their memory of that issue. In order to determine 
the extent to which metaphor can influence memory of a narrative, we have expanded upon the 
metaphors of Thibodeau and Boroditsky, which describe crime as either a beast preying upon a 
city or as a virus infecting a city, to create a short narrative about crime in the fictional city of 
Addison (2011, 2013).  
To do so, we conducted two norming studies and an experiment. The first norming study 
was designed to gauge the associations that people have with crime. The second was designed to 
measure whether these common associations are more consistent with a virus schema for crime 
or a beast schema for crime. In the experiment, we included some information that was more 
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consistent with a virus schema and some information that was more consistent with a beast 
schema. Half of the participants were presented with a report in which crime was metaphorically 
framed as a virus, while crime was described as beast to the other half.  
Our prediction was that framing crime as a virus would instantiate a particular knowledge 
structure in the minds of the reader that would lead them to remember frame-consistent 
information better than frame-inconsistent information. This result would mimic those of 
eyewitness reports of crimes, which find that schema typical information is better remembered 
over the long term (e.g., Graesser et al., 1980; Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Hastie & Kumar, 1979). 
Participants were exposed to the narrative in either text or audio form, both to mimic the style of 
a political address or radio news, as well as to see whether we could replicate the results from 
Read et al. – that information with a metaphor frame is more readily recalled when presented 
orally (1990).  
 
Norming Study 1: What do people associate with crime? 
Method 
Participants 
 100 American participants (49.5% male) were recruited from and paid though from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. The average age of these participants was 19.49 years old. While 
85% of participants identified as white, 10% identified as Black or African American and 8% as 
Asian. These participants were most strongly Democrat (42%), with another 23% considering 
themselves Republican, 31% Independent, and 4% other.  On a scale from 0 (Very Liberal) to 
100 (Very Conservative), participants’ mean ideology was 43.25. The majority (36%) of 
participants had attended a 4-year college, while the next group (24%) had attended at least some 
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college; only 11% of participants had a high school education or less and 20% had done some 
post-graduate work. When asked which metaphor was a more appropriate metaphor for crime, 
75% of the participants thought it was the virus metaphor, while only 25% believed it was the 
beast metaphor.  
Materials and procedure 
 Norming Study 1 was used to gauge what people think are the typical causes, examples, 
and solutions to crime. Participants were asked to list 5 causes of crime, 5 types or examples of 
crime, and 5 approaches or solutions to crime. Participants were then asked to list 2 causes of, 
types of, and approaches to crime that they thought were most consistent with the two metaphor 
frames: virus and beast. Participants were not instructed to think of novel causes, examples, or 
solutions for each section– in some cases participants repeated responses that they had 
previously given; in other cases, participants provided novel information.  
After to responding to these questions, participants answered a series demographic 
questions, including their age, gender, ethnicity, first language, level of education, 
socioeconomic status, country of residency, and political affiliation and ideology. 
Results 
The responses of the participants were grouped into 16 different categories of causes of 
crime, 12 different categories of examples of crime, and 12 different categories of solutions to 
crime, that emerged from reading the range of responses. In Table 1, these responses have been 
abbreviated to the five most common categories for each information type (cause, example or 
solution).  
Overall, causes of crime tended to refer to issues at the societal level. Problems with 
unemployment, the economy, drug use, or education were often considered to be causes of 
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crime. Very few causes of crime are focused on individuals, such as crime being caused by an 
intrinsic trait in the criminals. On the other hand, examples of crime were often focused on the 
individual, with murder, larceny, and robbery among the most common responses. Finally, 
solutions to crime were mixed: some suggestions, such as increasing police presence, promoting 
stricter punishments, and creating a neighborhood watch, were focused on individual criminals 
while others, such as education and economic reform, examined crime at a societal level.  
When the general suggestions were compared to those for the virus and beast metaphors, 
the proportional number of causes, examples, and solutions in each category differed by request 
type. Causes focused on infrastructure, such as economic problems, poor education, and drug 
use, were much more heavily favored for virus metaphor. Meanwhile, violent crimes, such as 
murder and sexual assault, were much more frequently chosen in for the Beast metaphor.  
Table 1. 
	   	   	   	  Top 5 most frequently mentioned causes, examples, and solutions to crime  










Economic Cause 19.19 10.61 16.95 
Drugs Cause 17.17 12.63 12.57 
Environment Cause 9.26 7.58 9.91 
Intrinsic  Cause 5.56 14.65 8.08 
Organized Crime Cause 6.57 11.11 6.62 
Murder Example 7.07 24.24 15.71 
Larceny Example 14.65 8.59 12.23 
Robbery Example 10.10 11.11 11.45 
Drugs Example 22.22 9.60 11.11 
Assault & Battery Example 6.06 9.60 10.25 
Increase Policing Solution 29.80 35.61 25.65 
Education Reform Solution 10.10 7.58 12.12 
Stricter Punishments Solution 11.11 18.67 10.49 
Neighborhood Watch Solution 8.08 9.60 10.44 
Community Programs Solution 4.55 4.55 9.43 
Note. The categories are displayed in descending order of percent total of suggestions within 
Information Type. “Drugs” were considered both a cause – such as someone robbing a bank in 
order to obtain enough money to buy heroin – and example – drug use or sale is illegal – of crime 
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by participants. The “Intrinsic” category refers to intrinsic traits within a criminal that would 
predispose them to committing crimes. “Larceny” refers to theft without threat of violence, while 
“Robbery” refers to theft with threat of violence.  
  
Discussion 
In this study, we developed a picture of how people tend to think about various aspects of 
crime, including some of the most common causes, examples, and solutions to crime. We also 
started investigating relationships between the metaphors and the aspects of crime that they tend 
to associate with. When considering the virus metaphor, participants tended to respond more 
frequently with causes relating to infrastructure – such as education, the economy, or drug use – 
than when responding to the beast metaphor. When responding to the beast metaphor, 
participants were much more likely to mention sudden violent crimes like murder or sexual 
assault than when responding to the virus metaphor.  We expand on this investigation with in a 
more targeted norming study below.  
 
Norming Study 2: What do people associate with crime viruses and crime beasts? 
Method 
Participants 
 200 American participants (52% male) were recruited from and paid through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. The mean age of participants was 21.86 years old. The vast majority of 
participants were white (81%), while only 7% identified as Black or African American, and 6% 
as Asian. Most participants (34%) had received a bachelor’s degree and 67% had at least some 
college education. Meanwhile, only 12% of participants had a high school education or less and 
16% had done at least some post-graduate work. Democrats made up the majority of participants 
(48%), while Republicans made up 23%, Independents 27%, and 1% other political affiliations. 
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On a scale from 0 (Very Liberal) to 100 (Very Conservative), participants’ mean ideology was 
39.87. Once again, the majority of participants viewed the virus metaphor (60%) as more 
appropriate than the beast metaphor (40%), though the difference was less extreme than with 
Norming Study 1. 
Materials and procedure.  
From the categories of causes, examples, and solutions to crime found in Norming Study 
1, fifteen causes, examples, and solutions of crime were selected. The pieces of information were 
selected from the most frequent responses of Norming Study 1, so that all the major categories of 
crime were represented. Care was taken not to have pieces of information overlap – e.g., 
although larceny and robbery are considered different crimes by law (the latter involving threats 
of violence while the former does not), they were considered functionally the same in this study. 
The causes, examples, and solutions were also chosen to likely be associated with one metaphor 
or the other, though some were chosen precisely because of their ambiguity. “Neighborhood 
watch”, for example, is a solution to crime that in previous experiments by Thibodeau and 
Boroditsky (2011, 2013), has be associated with both beast and virus metaphors, and we were 
curious whether this group of participants would more strongly associate it with one metaphor or 
the other.  
Participants made two judgments about each piece of information. First, they were asked 
how consistent each cause/example/solution of crime was with the metaphors (two questions, 
one for each metaphor). Participants rated each of the forty-five crime-related pieces of 
information on a scale from 1 (Very Inconsistent) to 7 (Very Consistent) with the beast and virus 
metaphors, separately. Then participants were asked about the salience of each piece of 
information. After rating each of the causes, participants were asked to what extent they agree 
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that that cause is “a major cause of crime”, from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). 
After each example of crime, participants were asked how common a crime they believed it was 
on a scale from 1 (Extremely uncommon) to 7 (Extremely common). Finally, after each solution 
to crime, participants were asked how effective they believed each solution to crime would be, 
from 1 (Very Ineffective) to 7 (Very Effective).   
 After they had finished rating the forty-five crime-related pieces of information, 
participants were asked the same series of demographic questions from Study 1. In addition, 
participants were asked about a series of questions about their personal experience with crime, 
from rating the seriousness of crime in their communities to whether they or someone they know 
have ever served time in jail or is currently working in law enforcement. Participants were also 
asked whether they believed that the virus or beast metaphor was more appropriate to describe 
crime overall.  
Results 
The forty-five pieces of information were analyzed using paired sample t-tests, which 
compared the ratings for consistency with the virus and beast metaphors. Overall, the results 
were quite polarized. Nearly all of the causes and solutions were rated as more consistent with 
the virus metaphor than the beast metaphor (only four out of the thirty causes and solutions were 
consistent with the beast metaphor, two for causes and two for solutions), while almost all of the 
examples were considered more consistent with the beast metaphor (only two out of the fifteen 
examples were consistent with the virus metaphor). However, the strength of this relationship 
varied considerably depending on the piece of information. Out of these forty-five pieces of 
information participants rated, twelve were selected to use in the narrative, which were most 
strongly consistent with either the beast or virus metaphor. Four causes, examples, and solutions 
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were selected, such that there would be little overlap between pieces of information and that 









 During this experiment, we found the 12 causes, examples, and solutions to crime that 
were the most polarized: the most strongly consistent with either the virus or beast metaphors. 
Six pieces of information, two per information type, were chosen for each metaphor. Some 
Table 2. 
	   	   	   	  Mean Differences for the Twelve Most Strongly Beast and Virus Causes, 
Examples, and Solutions to Crime  
Information 




Cause Family/Upbringing 1.01 0.691 1.32 
Cause Lack of Community 1.04 0.771 1.31 
Cause Lack of Police Presence -0.296 -0.587 -0.006 
Cause Organized Crime -0.523 -0.883 -0.162 
Example Drug Sale 0.593 0.271 0.915 
Example Prostitution 0.608 0.299 0.917 
Example Murder -2.38 -2.68 -2.07 
Example Rape -2.28 -2.6 -1.95 
Solution Increase Rehabilitation 1.18 0.893 1.469 
Solution Increase Mental Health Services 1.05 0.762 1.34 
Solution Increase Police Presence -0.412 -0.668 -0.156 
Solution Increase Punishments -0.94 -1.21 -0.667 
Note: All pieces of information chosen were found to be significantly virus- 
or beast-consistent. The mean difference (Mdiff) from these paired sample t-
tests is measured by Mvirus - beast such that the more negative a Mdiff score is, 
the more strongly consistent with the beast metaphor it is. 
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consideration was made to make sure pieces of information would not overlap, but otherwise the 
pieces of information chosen for the narrative were those which were most consistent with one of 
the metaphors. The most polarized information was used in the hope that it would be most easily 
primed by the metaphor with which it was consistent, if the relationship between them was 
strong. However, the selection process was simplified by the polarization of the information 
types – causes and solutions were almost always consistent with the virus metaphor while the 
examples were almost always consistent with the beast metaphor. This trend may indicate that 
the virus and beast metaphors are instantiating entirely different ways of examining crime. The 
virus metaphor may prime participants to consider the fuller context of a given crime, like the 
full course of a disease: both the virus itself (the cause) as well as its treatment (the solution), not 
just the symptom (the example) it produces. Meanwhile, the beast metaphor may only prime 
participants to see the crime itself, rather than the factors surrounding it.  
 




 500 American participants were recruited from and paid through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. However, 27 participants were removed from the sample because they had participated in 
at least one of the previous studies. Another four participants were removed due to copy-pasting 
the narrative or inability to hear the audio, leaving a total of 469 participants for analysis. 
Of the remaining participants, 59% were female and the average age was 20.27 years old. 
As with the previous two studies, 82% of participants were white, while 10% were Black or 
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African American, and 5% were Asian. Democrats made up the majority (44%) of participants, 
while Independents (32%), Republicans (21%), and other political affiliations (3%) fell behind.  
On a scale from 0 (Very Liberal) to 100 (Very Conservative), participants’ mean ideology was 
40.88. As with the previous two studies, the virus metaphor was considered more appropriate 
than the beast metaphor for crime by 78% of participants.   
 
Materials and procedure 
There were two metaphor framing conditions (virus or beast) and two modalities of 
presentation (written or auditory), which yielded four between-subjects conditions. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. Everyone was exposed to the twelve 
causes, examples, and solutions to crime that emerged as most consistent with the two frames in 
Study 2, making information type (cause, example, and solution) and information metaphor 
(whether a piece of information is beast- or virus-consistent) within subjects measures. In the 
narrative shown below, the virus-consistent information is underlined and the beast-consistent 
information is bolded; the virus- and beast-consistent information was intermixed in order to 
prevent the creation of recency or primacy effects – no metaphor would dominate the beginning 
or end of the narrative. 
Crime is a [virus infecting/beast preying on] the city of Addison. It has 
crept into every crevice of life in this small city. Five years ago Addison was in 
good shape, with no obvious vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, in the past five years 
the city's defense systems have weakened, and the city has succumbed to crime. 
Today, there are more than 55,000 criminal incidents a year - up by more than 
10,000 per year. Thomas Wilson, Mayor of Addison, is now calling for a rise to 
action.  
“The brutal rape and murder of local high school student, Marissa Lee, 
was really the last straw for Mayor Wilson,” said a confidential source inside the 
mayor’s office, “He called in the chief of police and yelled about how the police 
were sitting on their butts instead of patrolling around schools, protecting 
our children. I’d never seen him that angry before.” 
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Mayor Thomas Wilson believes a primary concern to be a lack of 
community within the city. “We need to find a way to come together again as a 
city and rebuild our true identity, not this invasion of gangs and fear that has 
overrun us. Parents have been sitting back instead of getting invested in their 
children’s lives, allowing them to be corrupted by these scoundrels”, said the 
mayor during his emergency press conference. 
Unfortunately, Marissa Lee is far from the only victim of Addison. The 
rapid rise in criminal organizations has destroyed untold number of lives, 
through both the sale of both sex and narcotics. There is great concern that new 
sex workers are being coerced under these operations and are unable to leave 
without fearing for their own or their families’ safety. With the way events are 
headed, there is a worry that if the city does not regain its strength soon, even 
more serious problems may start to develop. 
But there is still hope for Addison. Mayor Wilson plans on pushing for a 
larger and better-equipped police force to patrol the city, as well as 
increasing punishments for any lawbreakers caught within his jurisdiction. 
But these are not the only changes Wilson plans on making, “We must get 
our citizens the treatment they need. We can get as many officers as we want, but 
if we cannot destroy the demand for drugs through rehabilitation, nothing will 
change.” In addition, Wilson demands that better mental health services be 
provided for both victims of crimes perpetrated in Addison and the members of 
our police force who have been exposed far too much suffering in the line of 
duty.   
     Mayor Wilson will have to push these changes through the city council, who 
are not known for their proactive stance, so only time will tell whether these 
policies will come to fruition. 
 
Participants were instructed to read (or listen to) the narrative carefully. They were not told to try 
and commit the narrative to memory or that they would be asked to recall the narrative from 
memory.  
After exposure to the narrative, participants were asked to complete a five minute filler 
task: 25 arithmetic problems. Then participants were probed for their memory of the report in 
two ways: first, they were asked to write as much of the information from the report that they 
could remember in a free recall task. The participants then underwent a recognition memory task 
in which participants had to check which of a series of eight causes, eight examples, and eight 
solutions were actually present in the narrative, half of which actually were present in the 
narrative, while the other half were not.  
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In the free recall task, participants were asked to type as much of the narrative as they 
could in the span of five minutes, which was monitored and restricted through Qualtrics’ timing 
mechanism. Then they were given lists of causes, examples, and solutions to crime – the 
recognition task. Four items of each list were in the narrative, while another four were other 
items from the list of forty-five causes, examples, and solutions from Study 2 that were never 
mentioned within the narrative. Participants were asked to check which items they could 
remember from the narrative. After completion of the recognition task, participants were given 
the same series of demographic questions as in Study 2, then paid.  
 Although the participants worked without supervision through Qualtrics, a timer 
monitored and recorded the amount of time participants spent on each page. It also informed the 
participants how much time had passed. These pages would automatically cut forward after the 
time limit had been reached, to prevent participants spending more than the allotted time on 
tasks.  
Planned Analysis 
When examining the free recall data, information which was present in the narrative was 
checked off, so that a participant could receive anywhere from zero to twelve checks. These 
checks belonged to one of two levels of the within subjects measure of information metaphor – 
whether the information itself was consistent with the beast or virus metaphor – as well as the 
information type – whether it was a cause, example, or solution. In the recognition task, 
participants were asked to check which of a list of eight causes, examples and solutions each 
were present in the narrative. Checks were considered either a correct response, if the item had 
been in the narrative, or an intrusion, if the item was not. The correct responses were analyzed 
separately from the intrusions. Responses to both tasks were therefore analyzed based on two 
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between subjects factors -  framing metaphor (virus or beast) and modality (text or audio) – as 
well as three within subjects measures – the information metaphor (virus or beast), information 
type (whether it was a cause, example, or solution), and the memory task (free recall or 
recognition).  
For analyzing both the free recall and recognition data, a logistic regression was run, 
rather than an ANOVA or ANCOVA, since ANOVAs can lead to spurious results when 
examining categorical outcome variables (Jaeger, 2007). In every analysis, the deviance between 
the models (i.e., difference in likelihood ratios) is reported as an index of model fit: model 
deviance approximates a chi-square distribution with the number of added parameters as its 
degrees of freedom (Menard, 2002).  
 
Results 
Free Recall  
 
 In the Free Recall task, participants were asked to write down as much as they could of 
the narrative they had either read or listen to, which had been framed with either the beast or 
virus metaphor. If metaphors instantiating schemas, as we predicted, then participants should 
who received the beast metaphor should remember more beast consistent information, while 
those who were exposed to the virus metaphor should do the opposite. The free recall data was 
analyzed using a logistic regression; however, intrusions were not measured, since it would be a 
considerable undertaking to measure the consistency of unknown pieces of information with the 
beast and virus metaphors.  
Participants showed a main effect of media type on their recollection, χ2(1) = 15.072, p < 
.001. They were more likely to recall information that was read than heard. A sizable main effect 
was also found for information type – whether the piece of information was a cause, example, or 
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solution, χ2(2) = 13.939, p < .001. Examples of crime were remembered far more readily than 
either causes or solutions. An interaction was also found between media and information type, 
χ2(2) = 30.838, p < .001 (see Figure 1), such that solutions to crime were remembered far better 
























Figure 1. The significant interaction between information and media types for the recall task. 
Solutions were much more readily recalled when the narrative was presented as text. The bars 
represent the average proportion of correct responses out of the total possible within that group 
(i.e., a participant could remember anywhere between zero and four causes, so a bar around 0.5 
would indicate that the average participant remembers two out of the four possible causes to 
recall). All figures measure recall in the same way.   
 
We did find a main effect for the metaphor frame, χ2(1) = 4.513, p = .034 (see Figure 2). 
Participants who were given the virus metaphor at the beginning of the narrative were able to 
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expected interaction between metaphor frame and information type did not appear, χ2(2) = 2.864, 
p = .239; nor was there a three-way interaction between metaphor frame, information type, and 
media type, χ2(3) = 4.001, p = .261.   
 
Figure 2. The main effect of metaphor on recall. As shown above, participants who were 
exposed to the virus metaphor recalled more overall.  
 
Recognition 
In the recognition task, participants were asked to check which of a series of 8 causes, 
examples, and solutions to crime were present in the narrative they had read, where 4 of each 
group had been present, while the other 4 had not. Participants who received the beast metaphor 
should have more easily recognized the beast consistent information, while the reverse was true 
of those who received the virus metaphor frame. Unlike with the free recall task, the logistic 
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information was a cause, example, or solution (χ2(2) = 1.207, p = .547). Also unlike in the free 
recall task, participants did not differ in their recognition of information by framing metaphor 
(χ2(1) = 1.234, p = .267).  
Similarly to the free recall task, there was a main effect of media type – whether the 
participant was exposed to the narrative in text or audio form. Participants recognized more 
information when it was presented in a text narrative than audio, χ2(1) = 24.923, p < .001. There 
was also a main effect of metaphor-related information, χ2(1) = 6.309, p = .012. Participants 
more easily remembered information from the narrative that was rated as consistent with the 
beast metaphor in Norming Study 2 than information that was more consistent with the virus 
metaphor (see Figure 3). The logistic regression also found an interaction between information 
type and media, χ2(2) = 16.694, p < .001. While participants were more likely to remember 
examples over causes and solutions, this effect is much more extreme for participants who 
listened rather than read the narrative. However, the logistic regression found no interaction 
between metaphor and information type (χ2(2) = .563, p = .755) or a three-way interaction 
between metaphor, information type, and media, χ2(3) = 1.18, p = .758, which were the two 
hoped-for interactions.   
The intrusions were also analyzed in the same manner as the correct responses, using a 
logistic regression. Only a marginally significant interaction between information type and 
metaphor was found, χ2(2) = 4.871, p = .0876 (See Figure 4). While false positives for causes 
were more common for those given the virus metaphor, participants exposed to the beast 
metaphor made more intrusions for examples and solutions.  
 
 



















Figure 3. This figure displays the main effect of metaphor-consistent information on recognition. 
























Figure 4. The average proportion of intrusions (false positives) recognized by framing metaphor 
and information type, a marginally significant interaction. Participants who were given the beast 
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 In three experiments, we examined how participants relate to crime and interact with 
metaphors about crime. In the Norming Study 1, we surveyed participants for the first crimes, as 
well as the causes and solutions to crime, that came to mind, as well as which crime-related 
information they associated with two metaphors. The first metaphor described crime as a beast 
preying on the city of Addison, while the second viewed crime as a virus infecting the city of 
Addison. We found that participants were more likely to mention causes of crime at the societal 
level, such as economic difficulties or education deficits, which more clearly line up with the 
virus metaphor. Meanwhile, participants usually thought of examples of crimes at the individual 
level – particularly violent crimes such as murder or rape – which fit the beast metaphor. 
Solutions to crime were more mixed: while some targeted the problem of crime on the societal 
level, such as suggestions for economic reform, other participants pushed for solutions to crime 
that would affect individual criminals, such as instituting a neighborhood watch.  
 In Norming Study 2, we examined these relationships more closely, determining which of 
the forty-five categories produced were most consistent with the beast and virus metaphors, so 
that they could be used to create a narrative filled with the most strongly polarized information. 
As with the first norming study, causes and solutions were so strongly consistent with the virus 
metaphor, that there were only two causes and solutions which were significantly more 
consistent with the beast metaphor than the virus one. Likewise, only two examples of crime 
were significantly more consistent with the virus metaphor than the beast metaphor. These 
atypical causes, examples, and solutions were included in the main study’s narrative so 
participants would be exposed to both virus and beast-consistent information of all three 
information types.  
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In our main study, the narrative created from these beast- and virus-consistent pieces of 
information was framed by one of the two metaphors and presented in either a written or audio 
form in order to see whether these metaphors will systematically influence the memory of this 
information. We believed that participants who received the beast metaphor would be more 
likely to remember information that was most consistent with the beast schema, while 
participants who were exposed to the virus metaphor would remember more virus-consistent 
information. We did not expect, however, there to be differences in the how the metaphors 
affected memory depending on whether participants were engaged in the recognition or free 
recall tasks.  
In the recognition task, we found the greatest effect of the metaphors in what information 
was misremembered by participants. Participants who received the beast metaphor were more 
likely to falsely recognize solutions to crime that were not a part of the narrative than those who 
received the virus metaphor. If such an effect could be replicated, it could have wide-ranging 
implications for the realm of politics. Using particular metaphors might allow politicians to 
convince their audiences of the truth of specious facts, even if those facts are only associated 
with the ideas mentioned in their speeches. After all, if people are more likely to believe that 
they have been exposed to a cause or solution to crime before, they may be more likely to 
believe the cause is true or that the solution would be effective – an example of the illusory-
knowledge effect (see: Begg et al, 1996). The beast metaphor is of particular concern because 
participants were more likely to correctly recognize beast-consistent information, particularly if 
they heard the narrative rather than read it. Perhaps the beast-consistent information was more 
easily recognized because of its stronger negative emotional valiance. Crimes such as murder 
and rape are likely considered more strongly negative than prostitution or drug use and may be 
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more likely to be recalled as a result – an outcome of our negativity bias (Amabile, & 
Glazebrook, 1982).  
By contrast, in the free recall task, participants showed a difference in recall based on the 
information type – whether the piece of information was a cause, example, or solution to crime. 
Examples of crime were recalled far better than either causes or solutions. Once again, this may 
be tied into the stronger emotional valiance of the examples when compared to the causes or 
solutions. However, participants who read to the narrative remembered far more solutions than 
those who read it. This result conflicts strongly with the auditory recency effect (also known as 
the modality effect), which suggests that people are better able to remember information they 
have recently heard (Penney, 1989). Further research is required to unpack the full extent of this 
result. But of greater relevance to our hypothesis, there is an effect of the metaphor frame: 
participants who were exposed to the virus metaphor remembered more overall than those who 
received the beast metaphor. While the metaphor used did not systematically affect what 
participants could recall, it still shaped their overall ability to recall information.  
The fact that participants exposed to the virus metaphor remembered more causes, 
examples, and solutions indicates that perhaps the virus schema instantiates a full sequence of 
events rather than an isolated incident. When a person becomes ill, they are ill because of a virus 
or bacteria (causes), which induces specific symptoms (examples), and can be treated through 
specific measures, such as medication or bed-rest (solutions). Meanwhile, when a person 
contemplates the idea of a crime as a beast, they may be more likely to think of a singular event 
– the beast’s attack – rather than considering why a beast might attack or how to prevent further 
attacks. Perhaps attacking is simply considered an aspect of the beast’s nature, rather than the 
result of any outside influence, so no causes are looked for. If these beast and virus schemas are 
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considered in such a way, this could explain why participants who were given the virus metaphor 
were able to remember more than those given the beast metaphor – they were primed for that 
sequence of occurrences rather than an isolated event.  
However, further study is required to fully understand how these metaphors are affecting 
memory.  One other question of note would be how these effects would change with an alteration 
in the time between encoding and recall. Would increasing the distance between exposure to the 
narrative and the recall of its contents increase these effects, since more information which is 
considered irrelevant would have been forgotten; or would the reverse be true, as the metaphors 
themselves are forgotten?   
 
Conclusion 
Metaphors, regardless of the precise details of the schemas involved, do appear to 
instantiate schemas and influence memory as a result. While this effect is not strong enough or 
precise enough to make specifically targeted pieces of information more memorable, metaphors 
are can still effectively shape what types of information are perceived as important and, 
therefore, are remembered. In order to more fully explore this phenomenon, further research 
must be done, not only with the metaphors used in this study, but with other similarly polarized 
metaphors as well to determine how widespread this effect truly is.  
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